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Electoral prediction from Twitter data is an appealing research topic. It seems relatively straightforward and the 
prevailing view is overly optimistic. This is problematic because while simple approaches are assumed to be good 
enough, core problems are not addressed. Thus, this paper aims to (1) provide a balanced and critical review of the state 
of the art; (2) cast light on the presume predictive power of Twitter data; and (3) depict a roadmap to push forward the 
field. Hence, a scheme to characterize Twitter prediction methods is proposed. It covers every aspect from data 
collection to performance evaluation, through data processing and vote inference. Using that scheme, prior research is 
analyzed and organized to explain the main approaches taken up to date but also their weaknesses. This is the first 
meta-analysis of the whole body of research regarding electoral prediction from Twitter data. It reveals that its 
presumed predictive power regarding electoral prediction has been rather exaggerated: although social media may 
provide a glimpse on electoral outcomes current research does not provide strong evidence to support it can replace 
traditional polls. Finally, future lines of research along with a set of requirements they must fulfill are provided. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Real world events have an impact in online systems and trails left by users on such systems have been 
used to perform early event detection in an automatic fashion. Indeed, a number of well-known studies 
have shown that flu [Ginsberg et al. 2009], unemployment rates [Choi and Varian 2009a], or car sales 
[Choi and Varian 2009b] can be forecasted on the basis of Web search queries.  
Previously, but in a similar way, blog posts were correlated with book sales [Gruhl et al. 2005] or movie 
gross incomes [Mishne and Glance 2006]. It must be noted that while queries are not amenable to 
sentiment analysis, blog posts are and, hence, applying opinion mining to blogs stronger correlations can be 
found –e.g. [Mishne and de Rijke 2006; Mishne and Glance 2006]. 
When compared to blogs, microblogging is a recent phenomenon; nevertheless, it has attracted a good 
deal of attention on the basis that it can help to “take the pulse” of society. Indeed, the brevity of 
microposts coupled with the fact that a single service (i.e. Twitter) is the de facto standard for such kind of 
publishing, has turned this data into a new favorite for researchers. 
Therefore, based on the data abundance offered by Twitter, and in light of the excellent results obtained 
in the past by mining query logs and blogs, it is unsurprising that a number of studies have been conducted 
on predicting both present and future events from tweets. 
For instance, [Asur and Huberman 2010] exploited Twitter data to predict box-office revenues for 
movies; [O‟Connor et al. 2010] rather successfully correlated tweets with several public opinion time 
series; [Tumasjan et al. 2010] claimed to have predicted the outcome of German elections, [Bollen et al. 
2011] the stock market, and [Lampos and Cristianini 2010] the evolution of flu pandemics. 
A superficial glimpse on that growing body of literature could suggest that Twitter data has an 
impressive –and versatile– predictive power. However, this has been questioned. For instance, [Wong et al. 
2012] raised some doubts on the predictability of box-office performance from Twitter data; and, in a 
similar way, [Jungherr et al. 2011] rebutted the main thesis by Tumasjan et al., namely, that tweets and 
votes are strongly correlated. 
Therefore, who is right? Those who claim Twitter data is a good predictor or their critics? 
First of all, we must acknowledge a strong bias permeating research: The tendency of researchers to 
report positive results while not reporting negative ones. This bias, the so-called “file drawer” effect 
[Fanelli 2010], is extremely harmful.  
Firstly, it makes us to assume that published (positive) results are the norm and, hence, that they are to 
be expected in the future.  
Secondly, it makes difficult to publish negative results since the burden of proof lies on those criticizing 
the prevailing (positive) point of view. 
That said it goes without saying that it is far from trivial proving or disproving most of the 
aforementioned methods of prediction. For one reason, most of them –namely, those involving box-office 
results, the stock market, epidemics, or opinion polls– are not predicting an event but showing correlation 
between two different time series: One produced from Twitter data and another obtained from the “off-
line” world.  
In that regard, such methods are models and, therefore, they can be more or less accurate and, in turn, 
more or less useful.  
Nevertheless, there is an area where discrete results at specific moment –i.e. predictions– are expected: 
Politics.  
Clearly, voters can be more or less close to a candidate but, eventually, each of them has to cast a vote. 
Similarly, polls change over time but once polling stations are closed, the number of ballots is fixed, and 
there is a winner. 
As it has been implied above, there are opposing points of view with regards to the predictive power of 
Twitter data on elections. However, there is no controversy here: by analyzing prior reports we can reach 
sound conclusions on the presumed power of state-of-the-art methods and, much more important, we can: 
1. Point out the main weakness in current approaches. 
2. Suggest important challenges that are still open and core lines of future research; and 
3. Provide recommendations and conclusions for those interested in pushing forward this area. 
Such contributions require a thorough review of the body of literature. Nevertheless, more important 
than providing a bibliography it is to organize such different reports within a coherent conceptual scheme. 
That scheme is covered in the following section. 
2 CHARACTERIZATION OF TWITTER-BASED ELECTORAL PREDICTION METHODS 
Although unstated, it is assumed that any method to predict electoral results from Twitter data is an 
algorithm; otherwise, it would be impractical and pointless.  
Therefore, such methods process some collection of tweets to make predictions; they are parameterized 
to adapt to different scenarios; and, finally, predictions can be more or less detailed (for instance, just 
providing the winner or vote rates for the different candidates) and they should be eventually evaluated 
against the actual results. 
Thus, there are a number of characteristics and sub-characteristics defining any method to predict 
electoral results from Twitter; namely: 
1. Period and method of collection: i.e., the dates when tweets were collected, and the 
parameterization used to collect them. 
2. Data cleansing measures: 
a. Purity: i.e., to guarantee that only tweets from prospective voters are used to make the 
prediction. 
b. Debiasing: i.e., to guarantee that any demographic bias in the Twitter user base is 
removed. 
c. Denoising: i.e., to remove tweets not dealing with voter opinions (e.g. spam or 
disinformation) or even users not corresponding to actual prospective voters (e.g. 
spammers, robots, or propagandists). 
3. Prediction method and its nature: 
a. The method to infer voting intentions from tweets. 
b. The nature of the inference: i.e., whether the method predicts individual votes or 
aggregated vote rates. 
c. The nature of the prediction: i.e., whether the method predicts just a winner or vote rates 
for each candidate. 
d. Granularity: i.e., the level at which the prediction is made (e.g. district, state, or national). 
4. Performance evaluation: i.e., the way in which the prediction is compared with the actual outcome 
of the election. 
The papers analyzed in this work were characterized according to that scheme. Table II shows that 
characterization and it also includes descriptive information for each of the elections. 
2.1 General characteristics of research conducted up to date 
The first thing that Table II reveals is that, surprisingly, literature regarding electoral prediction is not 
prediction at all. All of the reports were written post facto and, hence, those studies discussing promising or 
even positive results describe, in fact, how elections could have been predicted. 
Moreover, although there is replication of results it is not usually conducted by the same authors 
proposing the original method. Fortunately, as it will be shown, only two “flavors” of voting inference in 
Twitter have been widely used –namely, tweet counts and lexicon-based sentiment analysis– and, thus, a 
number of papers have evaluated and compared both.  
In addition to that, a number of papers deal with the same elections. [O‟Connor et al. 2010] and [Gayo-
Avello 2011] covered the US presidential election in 2008. And [Tumasjan et al. 2010] and [Jungherr et al. 
2011] covered the German federal election in 2009. Those papers should clarify if consistent results can be 
obtained from Twitter data or if, by the contrary, results strongly depend on decisions made by the 
researchers. 
The rest of papers correspond to single case scenarios but [Metaxas et al. 2011] deserves special 
attention since it covers six different races from the same elections in the United States. That paper casts 
light on whether positive results achieved by those methods can be due to pure chance. 
With regards to the elections covered by the literature, the United States is the best studied scenario (4 
papers), followed by Germany (2 papers); Ireland, Singapore and Netherlands are covered by one paper 
each. 
2.2 Period of collection 
Table II reveals substantial variation among studies with regards to some of the characteristics in the 
scheme. 
For instance, the period of data collection varies widely. Table I shows that some studies collected data 
just one week before elections while others collected data for weeks, months or even years.  
There is, however, consensus about the ending point for the period of collection: the day before 
elections. The only paper contravening this rule is [Tumasjan et al. 2010] and, as it will be shown, this was 
a matter of criticism [Jungherr et al. 2011]. 
It must be noted that it is unclear the impact that the period of collection has in the predictions. 
[Jungherr et al. 2011] showed that by using different time windows performance underwent substantial 
variations. [Metaxas et al. 2011], using just one week of data, were able to obtain both correct and incorrect 
predictions. 
Hence, it is clear that further research is needed in this regard and compelling arguments are needed to 
choose a given period of collection.  
Table I. Different periods of data collection used in the literature ordered by decreasing time length. All of 
the studies, except for the one by Tumasjan et al. finished data collection the day before elections. 
Authors Start of collection End of collection 
Livne et al. 2011 3 years before election election day 
O'Connor et al. 2010 10 months before election election day 
Gayo-Avello 2011 
5 months before election 
(candidate nomination) 
election day 
Tumasjan et al. 2010 7 weeks before election one week before election day 
Jungherr et al. 2011 
7 weeks before election 
(to replicate findings by 
Tumasjan et al.) 
election day 
Skoric et al. 2012 1 month before election election day 
Bermingham & Smeaton 2011 3 weeks before election election day 
Metaxas et al. 2011 1 week before election election day 
Tjong Kim Sang & Bos 2012 1 week before election election day 
 
Authors Election 
Period & Method of 
collection 
Data cleansing Prediction method 
Performance 
evaluation 
Reported results 
O‟Connor et al. 2010 
US presidential 
election, 2008 
(Nov. 4, 2008) 
February to 
November 2008. 
Candidate names 
used as keywords. 
No cleansing at all. 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis. 
Aggregated results at 
national level.  
No prediction 
attempted. 
Correlation against 
pre-electoral polls. 
No significant 
correlation found. 
Gayo-Avello 2011 
June 1 to November 
3, 2008.  
Presidential and 
vice-presidential 
candidate names. 
Geolocated tweets at 
county level.  
Attempt to debias 
data according to 
user age. 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis. 
Individual votes. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
MAE against actual 
electoral results. 
MAE 13.10% 
(uncompetitive with 
traditional polls). 
Tumasjan et al. 2010 
German federal 
election, 2009  
(Sept. 27, 2009) 
August 13 to 
September 19, 2009. 
Parties present in the 
Bundestag and 
politicians from those 
parties. 
No cleansing at all. 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
national level.  
Vote rates. 
MAE 1.65% 
(comparable with 
traditional polls, 
although larger). 
Jungherr et al. 2011 
Different time 
windows from 
August 13 to 
September 27, 2009. 
Parties running for 
election. 
Unstable MAE 
depending on time 
window but larger 
than MAE reported 
by Tumasjan et al. 
2010.  
Incorrect prediction 
when taking into 
account all parties 
running for election. 
Table II. Different studies on the feasibility of predicting elections with Twitter data characterized according to the scheme proposed above. Reports are ordered 
according to date of election and not of publication. Results appear on the right; those positive are shaded.  
Metaxas et al. 2011 
US Senate special 
election in MA, 2010 
(Jan. 19, 2010) 
January 13 to 20, 
2010.  
Candidate names. 
No cleansing at all. 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Winner prediction 
and MAE 
Incorrect prediction. 
MAE 6.3%. 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis 
and vote share. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Correct prediction. 
MAE 1.2% 
US elections in CO, 
2010 
(Nov. 2, 2010) 
October 26 to 
November 1, 2010. 
Candidate names 
used to filter a 
gardenhose dataset. 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Incorrect prediction. 
MAE 24.6% 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis 
and vote share. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Correct prediction. 
MAE 12.4% 
US elections in NV, 
2010 
(Nov. 2, 2010) 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Correct prediction 
MAE 2.1% 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis 
and vote share. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Incorrect prediction 
MAE 4.7% 
Table II (continuation). Results by [Metaxas et al. 2011] when trying to replicate results using methods analogous to those by [O‟Connor et al. 2010; 
Tumasjan et al. 2010]. As it can be seen, results are inconclusive and there is no clear relation between MAE and accuracy of prediction.  
Metaxas et al. 2011 
US elections in CA, 
2010 
(Nov. 2, 2010) 
October 26 to 
November 1, 2010. 
Candidate names 
used to filter a 
gardenhose dataset. 
No cleansing at all. 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Winner prediction 
and MAE 
Correct prediction. 
MAE 3.8% 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis 
and vote share. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Incorrect prediction. 
MAE 6.3% 
US elections in KY, 
2010 
(Nov. 2, 2010) 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Correct prediction. 
MAE 39.6% 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis 
and vote share. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Correct prediction. 
1.2% 
US elections in DE, 
2010 
(Nov. 2, 2010) 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Incorrect prediction. 
MAE 26.5% 
Lexicon-based 
sentiment analysis 
and vote share. 
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Vote rates. 
Incorrect prediction 
MAE 19.8% 
Table II (continuation). Results obtained by [Metaxas et al. 2011] when trying to replicate results using methods analogous to those by [O‟Connor et al. 2010; 
Tumasjan et al. 2010]. As it can be seen, results are inconclusive and there is no clear relation between MAE and accuracy of prediction.  
Livne et al. 2011 
US elections, 2010 
(Nov. 2, 2010) 
March 25, 2007 to 
November 1, 2010. 
Tweets and social 
graph for 700 
candidates. 
Not applicable. 
This method did not 
employ potential 
voter tweets but 
candidate data. 
Regression models 
for binary results of 
races which included 
external data.  
Aggregated results at 
state level.  
Winner prediction. 
Winner prediction 
81.5% accuracy 
when using external 
data alone. 
83.8% accuracy 
when incorporating 
tweets (but not graph 
data). 
Not noticeable 
improvement. 
Bermingham & 
Smeaton, 2011 
Irish general election, 
2011 
(Feb. 25, 2011) 
February 8 to 25, 
2011. 
Major parties. 
No cleansing at all. 
Number of tweets 
(different samples 
tested).  
Aggregated results at 
national level.  
Vote rates. 
MAE against actual 
electoral results. 
MAE 5.58% 
(uncompetitive with 
traditional polls). 
ML-based sentiment 
analysis.  
Aggregated results at 
national level.  
Vote rates. 
MAE 3.67% 
(uncompetitive with 
traditional polls even 
after overfitting for 
using poll data for 
training). 
Skoric et al., 2012 
Singaporean general 
election, 2011 
(May 7, 2011) 
April 1 to May 7, 
2011.  
Tweets by 13,000 
Singaporean political 
engaged users.  
Parties and 
candidates names 
were used to filter the 
tweets. 
Only data produced 
by users located at 
Singapore was used. 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
national level.  
Vote rates. 
MAE 5.23% 
Inconclusive since 
pre-electoral polls are 
banned in Singapore. 
Table II (continuation). Studies by [Livne et al. 2011; Bermingham & Smeaton 2011; and Skoric et al. 2012]. The former is not properly a prediction method.  
Tjong Kim Sang & 
Bos, 2012 
Dutch senate 
election, 2011  
(May 23, 2011) 
February 23 to March 
1, 2011.  
Major parties. 
No cleansing at all. 
Number of tweets. 
Aggregated results at 
national level.  
Number of Senate 
seats. 
Offset in number of 
seats as compared 
with actual results. 
MAE (computed by 
this author) 1.33% 
Competitive with 
traditional polls. 
Attempt to debias 
data according to 
political leaning by 
using pre-electoral 
polling data 
Sentiment analysis. 
Aggregated results at 
national level. 
Number of Senate 
seats. 
MAE (computed by 
this author) 2% 
Comparable to 
traditional polls 
although larger. 
Table II (ending). Study by [Tjong Kim Sang & Bos 2012]. MAE (computed by this author) is rather competitive with traditional polls. Interestingly, the more 
complex method incorporating sentiment analysis and some pre-election poll data underperforms the simpler relying on tweet counts. 
 
 
2.3 Data cleansing 
Data cleansing refers to measures adopted to make the prediction by (1) relying on those users who are 
prospective voters, (2) taking into account only those tweets dealing with the electoral process, and (3) 
correcting the collected data for any demographic bias in the Twitter user base. We will tackle with each of 
them individually.  
The first one, denoted above as purity, involves those decisions adopted to select Twitter users that are 
likely voters in the election of interest. Needless to say, such information is unavailable and, hence, the 
most one can do is to limit the data collection to those users located in the area of interest.  
This would discharge those users not providing a valid location or even emigrants eligible to vote, but it 
is a compromise solution to avoid taking into account users expressing their views on the campaign without 
being eligible to vote. 
Such a solution is feasible by using just geolocated tweets or checking the location string of the users 
within the collection. Rather surprisingly, only two studies in the literature have applied such a measure.  
[Gayo-Avello 2011] by relying on tweets geolocated in counties of interest, and [Skoric et al. 2012] by 
limiting the dataset to those users located in Singapore.  
Arguably, we could accept that [Tumasjan et al. 2010; Jungherr et al. 2011; Tjong Kim Sang & Bos 
2012] guarantee to a certain extent purity of the collection on the basis of language use. The first two 
papers deal with German elections and, thus, it is assumed than tweets about German parties and politicians 
written in German are, very likely, produced by German users and not Austrian or Swiss users. In the same 
way, the third study deals with Dutch elections and the data is probably originated in Netherlands and not 
Belgium.  
Nevertheless, when considering more globalized languages (as English, for instance) such an 
assumption is not acceptable and geolocation should be incorporated to guarantee the purity of the dataset. 
The second measure to clean the data is denoising. This includes any post-processing of the dataset to 
remove tweets or users not dealing with the electoral process or not corresponding to prospective voters, 
respectively. In other words, it implies the removal of spam, rumors, propaganda, disinformation and users 
producing noisy tweets. 
Table II reveals that no paper in the literature has adopted such measures although a few of them 
acknowledge the problem. For instance, [Metaxas et al. 2011] made this warning: 
 “Spammers and propagandists write programs that create lots of fake accounts and use 
them to tweet intensively, amplifying their message, and polluting the data for any 
observer. It‟s known that this has happened in the past. It is reasonable that, if the image 
presented by social media is important to some (advertisers, spammers, propagandists), 
there will likely be people who will try to tamper with it.” 
What is more, they conducted a experiment to check the robustness of commonly applied sentiment 
analysis methods to such a kind of manipulation finding that: 
 “[B]y just relying on polarity lexicons the subtleties of propaganda and disinformation 
are not only missed but even wrongly interpreted.” 
Hence, measures to filter noise in political tweets are not optional to produce accurate predictions. 
The third and last data cleansing measure is debiasing. Twitter‟s user base is not a representative sample 
of the population, and that problem can be tackled with by determining the demographic strata users belong 
to and weighting their tweets accordingly. 
The low representativeness of Twitter has been widely discussed. For instance, [danah boyd 2010] 
wrote the following: 
 “Big Data presents new opportunities for understanding social practice. Of course the 
next statement must begin with a „but.‟ And that „but‟ is simple: […] just because you 
have a big N doesn‟t mean that it‟s representative or generalizable.” 
Besides, even in the United States Twitter use is minor (11% of Americans) and their users are 
“overwhelmingly young” [Lenhart and Fox 2009]. 
This low representativeness is a major problem because dominating demographic groups may tilt 
toward a few selected political options [Smith and Rainie 2008], and such a leaning heavily distort results 
[Gayo-Avello 2011]. 
Hence, the only way to fight this problem is by (1) determining as much demographic information 
about Twitter users as possible, and (2) weighting tweets from each group according to prior knowledge 
about their electoral involvement. 
Needless to say, the first task is far from easy. Unlike other services such as Facebook, Twitter profiles 
do not include structured information. There is no way to indicate the user‟s sex or age and, instead, 
profiles consist of free text fields for name, location, website, and biography.  
Nevertheless, it is not unsolvable and in a later section some references on this matter are commented. 
Indeed, Table II reveals that two papers have tried debiasing.  
[Gayo-Avello 2011] was able to obtain the age for about 2,500 users in his dataset by crossing their full 
names and county with online public records. This way he found that the dataset was dominated by users in 
the 18-44 age interval. Then, by weighting their tweets according to age participation in the 2004 elections 
he was able to reduce the error from 13.10% to 11.61% –a significant boost in performance. 
[Tjong Kim Sang & Bos 2012] tried a different approach: debiasing the data according to the presumed 
political leaning of the population. Certainly, such a feature is extremely relevant, especially if a “shy-
Tory” effect1 is suspected. Unfortunately, their results were inconclusive since (1) the authors had to rely 
on pre-electoral polling data which could be seen as overfitting; and (2) the performance of the method 
when debiasing was no better than a simpler method based on tweet counts. 
Therefore, debiasing Twitter data according to demographic features of the users seems not only 
unavoidable but also to positively affect performance. 
2.4 Method of prediction 
2.4.1 Inferring votes by counting tweets 
Two main methods have been used to infer votes from tweets. The first one, originally proposed by 
[Tumasjan et al. 2010], consists of merely counting the tweets mentioning a given candidate or party. The 
larger the number of tweets, the larger the vote rate. 
Such a method is appealing for many reasons: it is easy to implement, it can be applied in near real-
time, and it can be used both to obtain aggregated vote rates and to infer voting intentions for individuals 
(i.e. the candidate a user is mentioning the most would be his or her chose). Moreover, [Tumasjan et al. 
2010] claimed the method exhibited good performance: 
“The mere number of tweets reflects voter preferences and comes close to traditional election polls.” 
Indeed, Table II shows they reported an error of 1.65% for the German federal elections in 2009.  
[Jungherr et al. 2011] later criticized some of the decisions taken by [Tumasjan et al. 2010], especially 
those regarding the selection of parties, and the period of data collection.  
As it has been discussed, the selected time window has an impact but error values found by [Jungherr et 
al. 2011] were in the order of that reported by [Tumasjan et al. 2010]. Nevertheless, using a time window 
ending at the election day (the most plausible decision) produced an error of 2.13% which is substantially 
larger than both the original report of [Tumasjan et al. 2010] and traditional polls. 
However, we have already stated that further research is needed with regards to periods of data 
collection and, moreover, there are no reasons to assume that tweet counting can be more sensitive to this 
issue than sentiment analysis. 
Arguably, it is the selection of the candidates and parties to monitor the key aspect of this method. 
However, except for the analysis of the Pirate Party case by [Jungherr et al. 2011] there are no studies in 
this regard: all of the papers applying tweet counting relied on major parties. 
Thus, are tweet counts for major parties a good predictor of voting intention? At first glance the answer 
could seem inconclusive; after all, half of the papers using that method correctly predicted the elections. 
However, from an intuitive point of view, it seems too good to be true. Does it mean that polarity in 
opinions does not matter? 
In this regard, a experiment conducted by [Gayo-Avello 2011] is rather instructive. He compared the 
performance of both the tweet counting method and the lexicon-based sentiment analyzer against a random 
classifier.  
                                                          
1
 This effect refers to those conservative voters not disclosing their intentions in polls and, thus, biasing the 
corresponding predictions for conservative vote 
To that end, he collected data from an informal opinion-poll conducted during the US presidential 
election in Twitter. A website called TwitVote
2
 asked users to declare their votes with a tweet tagged with 
the hashtag #twitvote. By collecting those tweets published in election day, he was able to find the actual 
votes for a number of users. Besides, by taking into account the proportion of twitvotes for both candidates 
the performance for a random classifier could be computed and taken as a baseline. 
This way, he found that tweet counts underperformed the random classifier for both candidates: slightly 
for Obama and by a huge margin for McCain. The lexicon-based sentiment classifier, however, 
outperformed the random classifier for both candidates.  
In other words, no matter how appealing it looks like, raw tweet counts is not close to taking random 
choices but worse. Hence, and spite of purportedly positive results, such a method should be avoided in the 
future. 
2.4.2 Inferring votes with sentiment analysis 
The other popular method to infer voting intentions from tweets is sentiment analysis. The name is 
misleading because despite the extensive research conducted in that field (cf. [Liu 2012]) virtually all of the 
studies on electoral prediction have relied on the simplest of methods. 
Except for [Bermingham and Smeaton 2011], and [Tjong Kim Sang and Bos 2012] who applied 
machine learning to train their sentiment classifiers –with mixed results, it must be said; the rest of studies 
have relied on lexicons to determine the polarity of tweets. 
[O‟Connor et al. 2010] were the first using that method. They relied on the lexicon by [Wilson et al. 
2005] which consists of a list of terms labeled as positive or negative. Thus, tweets can be scored one way 
or the other, or even assigned both scores. 
As with the previous method this one is also appealing because of its simplicity. However, it is also 
unsatisfactory. O‟Connor et al. already found many examples of incorrectly detected sentiment although 
they still argued that 
“With a fairly large number of measurements, these errors will cancel out relative to the quantity we are 
interested in estimating, aggregate public opinion.” 
This, however, can be problematic if the classifier is producing different amounts of errors for each 
candidate.  
In this regard, the experiment by [Gayo-Avello 2011] from previous subsection is pertinent again. He 
checked the performance of a lexicon-based classifier similar to that used by [O‟Connor et al. 2010] finding 
that precision for Obama was rather high (88.8%) but extremely poor for McCain (17.7%). Hence, although 
the method is certainly a classifier (since it outperforms a random one) it is not balanced and, therefore, it is 
unrealistic to expect errors to cancel out when aggregating results. 
Finally, [Metaxas et al. 2011] conducted additional experiments with lexicon-based methods 
confirming, firstly, that their performance is only slightly better than that of a random classifier; and 
secondly, that misleading information and propaganda are missed or wrongly interpreted as candidate 
support. 
In short, polarity based methods employed up to date: 
1. Miss the subtleties of political language.  
2. Exhibit very poor performance and,  
3. Produce unbalanced results making unrealistic to accept that errors will cancel out when 
aggregating data.  
Therefore, sentiment analysis remains as an open challenge in this field of research. 
2.5 Performance evaluation 
2.5.1 Evaluation measures 
The final question regarding electoral prediction methods is how to evaluate them. Needless to say, the 
actual outcome of the elections is needed but, what does that mean? The vote rates for each candidate? The 
seats achieved in congress or senate? The winner of the election? 
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Moreover, at which level should predictions be computed and evaluated? This is obvious for local 
elections but not that much for national elections which could be computed as an aggregated popular vote 
or at more fine-grained levels. 
Current research has produced predictions mainly at national level [Tumasjan et al. 2010; Jungherr et al. 
2010; Bermingham and Smeaton 2011; Skoric et al. 2012; Tjong Kim Sang and Bos 2012] with a few 
papers focusing at state level [Gayo-Avello 2011; Metaxas et al. 2011].  
Those predictions have been evaluated against vote rates [Gayo-Avello 2011; Tumasjan et al. 2010; 
Jungherr et al. 2011; Metaxas et al. 2011; Bermingham and Smeaton 2011; Skoric et al. 2012]; against 
number of seats [Tjong Kim Sang & Bos 2012]; and also as dichotomous decisions [Metaxas et al. 2011]. 
When predicting vote rates MAE (Mean Absolute Error) is commonly used after [Tumasjan et al. 
2010]. This measure allows researchers to compare their method‟s performance against that of pre-electoral 
polls.  
Winner prediction is also appealing but it can be misleading since no details are provided about how far 
or close the prediction was from the actual results and greatly depends on the granularity of the prediction. 
For instance, [Gayo-Avello 2011] predicted a Obama victory which was correct but that included a victory 
in Texas, which was incorrect.  
Moreover, results by [Metaxas et al. 2011] shown in Table II reveal that both tweet counts and 
sentiment analysis were able to correctly guess half of the races. However, as it will be discussed in the 
following subsection this is probably not a great performance.  
Finally, MAE is highly dependent on each race and election. For instance, the Senate election in 
Kentucky was correctly predicted with a MAE of 39.6% while a MAE of 6.3% produced an incorrect 
prediction in California (see Table II). 
2.5.2 What would be an appropriate baseline? 
The proper question is not which measure to apply but against which baseline to compare performance. 
With regards to winner prediction [Metaxas et al. 2011] suggested that: 
“Given that, historically, the incumbent candidate gets re-elected about 9 out of 10 times, the baseline 
for any competent predictor should be the incumbent re-election rate.” 
Under such assumption it is pretty clear that guessing 50% of the races is rather far from competent. 
With regards to vote rate prediction this author is not aware of any baseline akin to the previous one. 
Nevertheless, it seems plausible to use the results of the immediately prior election as a prediction.  
Certainly, this has got issues: e.g., new parties running for election or coalitions created or dismantled 
between elections. Still, it is simple and can provide an intuitive hint about how “hard” or “easy” to predict 
an election can be. 
Hence, such a baseline has been used to produce the data in Table III and to discuss the performance of 
the prior methods when predicting different elections. Both the table and the discussion appear in the 
following subsection. 
2.6 Can or cannot elections be predicted from Twitter data? 
Table II describes 14 different attempts to predict elections based on Twitter data
3
. Only half of them 
were successful, one was the result reported by [Tumasjan et al. 2010] –strongly contested by [Jungherr et 
al. 2011]– and the rest correspond to predictions in the paper by Metaxas et al. who, in turn, were able to 
predict half of the races.  
All of this looks close to mere chance and, moreover, reported values of MAE are not directly 
comparable neither between papers nor races in the same election. 
Hence, a new baseline was suggested in previous section: assuming past vote rates would happen again. 
Therefore, any method underperforming the MAE of such a baseline should be considered unsuccessful. 
Thus, performance measures were computed for each of the elections studied in the literature for (1) the 
proposed baseline, (2) Twitter predictions based on tweet counts, and (3) Twitter predictions based on 
sentiment analysis where available.  
Fortunately enough, all of the papers, except for [Tjon Kim Sang and Bos 2012] directly provide such 
information. In the later case it was computed from the results reported by the authors (seats in the Senate). 
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 As it will be shown in the commented bibliography [O‟Connor et al. 2010; Livne et al. 2011] were not 
properly predictions. 
Table III shows those performance measures which can help us to draw some conclusions about the 
predictive power of currently applied methods. 
2.6.1 Can tweet counts predict elections? 
There are three reports where predictions based on tweet counts outperform the baseline: [Tumasjan et 
al. 2010; Bermingham & Smeaton 2011; Tjon Kim Sang & Bos 2012]. Other three reports reveal that such 
a method underperforms the baseline: [Gayo-Avello 2011; Metaxas et al. 2011; Skoric et al. 2012].  
Again, we could be facing something due to pure chance. On top of that, [Jungherr et al. 2011] showed 
that (1) prior important decisions regarding which parties to consider are required; and (2) performance 
measured by MAE strongly depends on the time window employed.  
Indeed, all the researchers who have replicated the method by [Tumasjan et al. 2010] discharged minor 
parties –even those with results underperforming the baseline. 
So, in short, Twitter prediction based on tweet counts: 
1. Is too dependent on arbitrary decisions such as the parties or candidates to be considered, or the 
selection of a period for collecting the data. 
2. Its performance is too unstable and strongly dependent on such parameterizations, and 
3. Considering the reported results as a whole it seems plausible that positive results could have been 
due to chance or, even, to unintentional data dredging due to post hoc analysis. 
In the absence of further research showing that the method can consistently predict future results for a 
number of elections outperforming both the incumbency and the past-results baselines, we must conclude 
that there is no strong evidence to consider it a valid method of prediction. 
2.6.2 Can Twitter sentiment predict elections? 
It is unclear the impact that sentiment analysis has in Twitter-based predictions. The studies applying 
that technique are fewer than those counting tweets and the picture they convey is confusing to say the 
least. 
According to [Gayo-Avello 2011] sentiment analysis is better than raw tweet counts but it still 
underperforms the baseline.  
[Metaxas et al. 2011] reveal that it outperforms not only raw counts but also the baseline. However, 
they also showed that lexicon-based methods are close to random classifiers (a finding also exposed by 
[Gayo-Avello 2011]) and that the proportion of correctly guessed races is no better than chance. 
Results in [Bermingham & Smeaton 2011; Tjon Kim Sang & Bos 2012] introduce even more 
confusion. The former found that sentiment analysis outperforms the baseline but their method was 
overfitted since they incorporated data from pre-electoral polls, hence, being inconclusive. Results by the 
second authors reveal that their most complex method (involving not only sentiment analysis but also 
political leaning information derived from pre-electoral polls) outperforms the baseline but is not better 
than raw tweet counts. 
In short, results are contradictory. However, taking into consideration that even naïve sentiment 
analysis seems to outperform the baseline it is clear that further research is needed in that line. This work 
concludes with some recommendations in that sense. 
Table III. Performance measured as MAE for a naïve baseline predicting past vote rates will happen again 
and the two different kinds of Twitter predictions (i.e. those based on tweet counts and those relying on 
sentiment analysis). Those methods outperforming the baseline appear shaded. 
Election Baseline 
Twitter prediction 
(tweet counts) 
Twitter prediction 
(sentiment analysis) 
US presidential 
election, 2008 
5.86% 
(states analyzed in 
Gayo-Avello 
2011) 
15.87% 
(computed for this paper from data 
by Gayo-Avello 2011) 
13.10% 
11.61% when debiasing according 
to age 
(Gayo-Avello 2011) 
German federal 
election, 2009 
3.75% 
1.65% (Tumasjan et al. 2010) 
From 1.51% to 3.34%  
(Jungherr et al. 2011) 
Not available 
US elections, 2010 
8.85% 
(states analyzed in 
Metaxas et al. 
2011) 
17.12% 
(Metaxas et al. 2011) 
7.58% 
(Metaxas et al. 2011) 
Irish general 
election, 2011 
6.26% 
5.58% 
(Bermingham and Smeaton 2011) 
3.67% 
includes polling data 
(Bermingham and Smeaton 2011) 
Singaporean 
general election, 
2011 
3.36% 
5.23% 
(Skoric et al. 2012) 
Not available 
Dutch senate 
election, 2011 
2.38% 
0.89% raw counts 
1.33% normalized counts 
(computed for this paper by the 
author from data by Tjong Kim 
Sang and Bos 2012) 
2% normalized counts plus 
debiasing 
(computed for this paper by the 
author from data by Tjon Kim Sang 
and Bos 2012) 
3 AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
This section covers the papers on electoral prediction analyzed above and, additionally, works on 
related areas such as credibility, rumors, and Twitter demographics. 
3.1 Electoral prediction from Twitter data 
3.1.1 O’Connor et al. 2010 
This is the earliest paper discussing the feasibility of using Twitter data as a substitute for traditional 
polls although it does not describe any prediction method. 
They employed a subjectivity lexicon to determine a positive and a negative score for each tweet in 
their dataset. Then, raw numbers of positive and negative tweets are used to compute a sentiment score.  
Using that method, sentiment time series were prepared for a number of topics (namely, consumer 
confidence, presidential approval, and US 2008 Presidential elections). Both consumer confidence and 
presidential approval polls exhibited correlation with Twitter sentiment data, but no correlation was found 
with electoral polls. 
3.1.2 Tumasjan et al. 2010, Jungherr et al. 2011, and Tumasjan et al. 2011 
The first paper started the whole line of research analyzed in this work and proposed MAE as a measure 
of performance. It has two distinct parts: In the first one LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) is 
used to perform an analysis of the tweets related to different parties running for the German 2009 Federal 
election. In the second part, the authors state that the mere count of tweets mentioning a party accurately 
reflected the election results with a performance close to that of actual polls.  
That claim was rebutted by [Jungherr et al. 2011] who pointed out that the method required arbitrary 
choices (e.g. not taking into account all the parties running for the elections) and that its results depended 
on the selected time window. 
[Tumasjan et al. 2011] tried to dispel those doubts. Unfortunately, their counterarguments are not 
compelling enough and, besides, they toned down their previous conclusions: saying that Twitter data is not 
to replace polls but to complement them; or stating that the prediction method was not their main 
contribution
4
. 
3.1.3 Metaxas et al. 2011. 
With [Jungherr et al. 2011] this is one of the few papers casting doubts on the predictive powers of 
Twitter. After analyzing results from a number of elections, they concluded that Twitter data is slightly 
better than chance when predicting elections. Hence, they suggested the use of incumbency as a baseline.  
They also described three necessary standards for any method claiming predictive power: (1) it should 
be an algorithm, (2) it should take into account the demographic bias in Twitter‟s user base, and (3) it 
should be “explainable”, i.e. black-box approaches should be avoided. 
3.1.4 Livne et al. 2011 
This is not a prediction method since it does not rely on users‟ tweets but in those by candidates plus 
their social graph. They also incorporate additional information such as the party a candidate belongs to, or 
incumbency. 
They claim 88% precision when incorporating Twitter data (both tweets and graph) versus 81% 
precision without such data; the improvement is not substantial although noticeable.  
Finally, it must be noted that elections are modeled as binary processes so important information is 
missed (such as in tight elections, or scenarios with coalitions). 
3.1.5 Bermingham and Smeaton 2011 
This paper discusses different approaches to incorporate sentiment analysis to a predictive method. The 
method was put to test with the 2011 Irish General Election revealing it was not competitive against 
traditional polls. 
3.1.6 Gayo-Avello 2011 
This paper describes how different methods failed to predict the 2008 US Presidential Election since 
they predicted an Obama victory in every state, including Texas. The methods were those proposed in 
[Tumasjan et al. 2010; O‟Connor et al. 2010] and a post-mortem on the reasons for such a failure is 
provided. 
A number of problems are suggested: (1) The “file-drawer” effect; (2) Twitter data is biased and is 
unrepresentative; and (3) the sentiment analyzers commonly used are only slightly better than random 
classifiers. 
3.1.7 Tjong Kim Sang and Bos 2012 
In this paper Twitter data regarding the 2011 Dutch Senate elections was analyzed. They found that 
tweet counting is a bad predictor and that sentiment analysis can improve performance. 
Nevertheless, performance is below that of traditional polls and, moreover, the method relies to some 
extent on that polling data to correct for demographic bias. 
3.1.8 Skoric et al. 2012 
Similarly to previous paper, this also shows that there is certain correlation between Twitter chatter and 
votes but not enough to make accurate predictions –they found performance was much worse than that 
reported in [Tumasjan et al. 2010].  
They argue that Twitter can provide a somewhat reasonable glimpse on national results but it fails when 
focusing on local levels. Hence, in addition to the technical caveats they discuss additional problems such 
as democratic maturity of the country, competitiveness of the election, and media freedom. 
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 Even when the phrase “predicting elections with Twitter” prominently appears in the title of that paper 
3.2 Sources of bias in Twitter 
3.2.1 Mislove et al. 2011 
This paper analyzes a sample of Twitter users in the US along three different axes, namely, geography, 
gender and race/ethnicity. 
The methods applied are simple albeit compelling. All of the data was inferred from the user profiles: 
geographical information was obtained from the self-reported location; gender was determined using the 
first name and statistical data from the US Social Security Administration; and the last name and data from 
the US Census was used to derive race/ethnicity. 
Cleary, such methods are prone to error but it is probably rather tolerable and the conclusions of the 
study are sensible: highly populated counties are overrepresented, users are predominantly male, and 
Twitter is a non-random sample with regards to race/ethnicity. 
They concluded that post-hoc corrections based on the over- and under-representation of different 
groups could be applied to improve predictions based on Twitter data. 
3.2.2 Mustafaraj et al. 2011 
This paper provides compelling evidence on the existence of two extremely different behaviors in social 
media: on one hand there is a minority of users producing most of the content (vocal minority) and on the 
other there is a majority of users who hardly produce any content (silent majority). 
These two groups are clearly separated and the vocal minority behaves as a resonance chamber 
spreading information aligned with their own opinions. Thus, they suggest extreme caution when building 
predictive models based on social media. 
3.3 Denoising Twitter data 
3.3.1 Mustafaraj and Metaxas 2010 
This paper introduces the concept of “Twitter-bomb”: the use of fake accounts in Twitter to spread 
disinformation by “bombing” targeted users who, in turn, would retweet the message achieving viral 
diffusion. 
They describe a smear campaign orchestrated by a Republican group against Democrat candidate 
Martha Coakley and how it was detected and aborted. 
3.3.2 Ratkiewicz et al. 2011 
This paper describes the Truthy project inspired by the previous paper. Truthy is a system to detect 
astroturf political campaigns either to simulate widespread support for a candidate or to spread 
disinformation. The system is described in detail and a number of cases and performance analysis are 
provided. 
3.3.3 Castillo et al. 2011, and Morris et al. 2012 
The first paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first one describing a method to separate credible 
from not credible tweets. It describes in detail which features to extract from the tweets to then train a 
classifier. 
[Morris et al. 2010] did not develop an automatic method to filter tweets but they conducted a survey to 
find the features that make users to perceive a tweet as credible. Content alone was found to be not enough 
to assess truthfulness so users rely on additional heuristics. These can be manipulated by the authors of 
tweets and, therefore, can affect credibility perceptions. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper concludes enumerating the main weaknesses of current research regarding political 
prediction with Twitter data. Then a list of open challenges and some recommendations for future research 
are provided. 
4.1 Weaknesses in current research 
The previous analysis of the literature revealed that the predictive power of Twitter regarding elections 
has been overstated and, indeed, recent results are not comparable to those by seminal papers.  
Some of the reported positive results can probably be attributed to chance or involuntary data dredging 
and, moreover, simple baselines achieve better performance in many cases. 
This is not surprising given that approaches up to date suffer a number of weaknesses that should be 
avoided in the future: 
1. All of them are post hoc analysis. 
2. Performance must be compared against reasonable baselines. 
3. Sentiment analysis is applied with naïveté. Commonly used methods are slightly better than 
random classifiers and fail to catch the subtleties of political discourse. 
4. All of the tweets are assumed to be trustworthy when it is not the case. 
5. Demographics bias is neglected even when it is well known that social media is not a random 
sample of the population. 
6. Self-selection bias is simply ignored. People tweet on a voluntary basis and, therefore, data is 
produced by those politically active. 
4.2 Open challenges 
A number of different lines of work must be pursued before making credible claims on electoral 
prediction from Twitter data: 
 The accuracy of sentiment analysis of political tweets must improve. Humor and sarcasm will play 
a major role. 
 New metrics of trustworthiness must be established; including, but not limited to, detection of 
propaganda, disinformation and robots, or credibility checking. 
 Basic research on Twitter demographics and automatic profiling of users with regards to 
demographic attributes is required. 
 Basic research on user participation regarding politics and self-selection bias is needed. 
4.3 Recommendations for future research 
Unless we avoid the mentioned weaknesses while focusing on the core lines of research depicted above, 
the obtained forecasts will be of questionable value or, worst, incorrect most of the time. This would taint a 
field of research that, properly explored, could be potentially useful. 
Therefore, a number of requirements are needed to guarantee not only the quality of the outcomes but 
also the generality of the methods applied. Such requirements are highly related to the characterization 
scheme depicted earlier: 
1. Performance should be evaluated against sound and credible baselines. 
2. The period and method of collection must be clearly specified and justified. Any prior decision 
regarding candidates or parties to be discharged must be justified. 
3. Data purity should be guaranteed. That is, only tweets by users eligible to vote should be 
collected. 
4. State of the art methods of sentiment analysis should be applied instead of simplistic and crude 
approaches. 
5. Noise in the data should be kept to a minimum. That is, serious attempts to remove spam and 
disinformation should be made. 
6. Bias in the data should be at least acknowledged and analyzed. Attempts to remove demographic 
bias are encouraged. Self-selection bias should be analyzed at least. 
4.4 Final note 
This paper must conclude, however, with a pessimistic remark. All previous considerations are a sine 
qua non to consider electoral predictions based on social media completely analogous to traditional polls.  
Unfortunately, as we move down the list of requirements the tasks are harder and even unattainable. 
Improving sentiment analysis with regards to political tweets will be difficult but probably achievable. 
Fighting demographic bias is at least conceivable in principle. However, accounting for self-selection bias 
could be unviable on a general basis; at least, not using Twitter data alone. 
Hence, social media may very well provide a glimpse on the outcome of elections, and the best the 
methods the most accurate the glimpse. However, current state of the art does not provide any strong 
evidence to support the idea it is going to replace traditional polls in the short term. 
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